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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
or incorrect sizes are of the heart of the sales contract, they need not be
warranted, and there is simply a breach of contract.
26
In the instant case, there was an express warranty covering excess loss
in quantity, which is rare, but exists as a custom in the alcoholic beverage
trade. If the warranty were treated as any other contract, it could be as-
signed, since there was no personal consideration. The whiskey stored in
a warehouse was untouched and unseen by the purchaser, and would have
been warranted to any vendee. Yet, because of the treatment of the assign-
ment of warranfies as different from other contracts, the court could not
examine this contract and call it assignable. Instead, it allowed assignment
on the basis of a distinction of this warranty of quantity from the usual
one of quality and title. If the court were faced with a situation in which
a warranty was clearly of quality and was equally as impersonal as this one,
it is uncertain whether assignment would be permitted. But the decision
does show a dissatisfaction with the practice of grouping warranties and
classifying them as unassignable. It also shows an inclination to examine
the individual warranty for its own terms and to consider it on its own
merits. This attitude is much more in keeping with the needs of a complex
modern business structure than is a rigid rule of lack of privity based in
antiquity and illogically perpetuated.
EMINENT DOMAIN - JUST COMPENSATION - COST
OF REMOVAL OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
The United States expropriated, for a term of years with an option to
renew, a warehouse leased by the defendants. The period originally con-
demned by the government would have expired before the termination of
the leasehold, but the government, by exercising its option, exhausted the
leasehold. The cost of removal of personal property was included in the
just compensation award of the lower federal courts. Held, that the market
rental value would not include the cost of removal of personal property,
when the exercise of the renewal option exhausted a leasehold which orig-
inally was not entirely condemned. United States v. Westinghouse Electric
& Manufacturing Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 644 (1950).
The Government may condemn property for a term of years, or for
an indefinite number of years,2 by condemning with an option to lengthen
or shorten the initial expropriation. When an option is, or is not, exercised
26. But see Abounader v. Strohmyer & Orpe Co., 243 N.Y. 458, 154 N.E. 309
(1926).
1. US. CONST. AMEND. V; 56 STAT. 177 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App. 632 (1946);
see United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 681 (1896).
2. United States v. Petty Motors Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); see United States v. Certain Parcels of
Land, 55 F. Supp. 257 (D.C. Md. 1944).
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the controversial issue is whether the expropriation is considered as the
taking for the initial period, or whether the taking is for the indcfinitc
period created by the option. When the entire leasehold interest is ex-
propriated, just compensation is the fair market value of the unexpired
term, less the rent provided in the lease.3 If the interest is taken with an
option to shorten,, which is not exercised, the leasehold is considered as com-
pletely exhausted for the purpose of determining the extent of the taking;
and the cost of removing personal property is not allowed.4 When only
part of a leasehold interest is condemned, the compensation for the unex-
pired interest remaining to the condemnee is the market rental value of the
property on a temporary sublease from a long term tenant.5 An option to
renew, which is not exercised, is considered as the taking for the shorter
period, so that removal costs of personal property are awarded, not as an
element of damage, but as bearing upon the market value of ihe leasehold.6
When the entire leasehold is exhausted, the cost of removing personal
property is usually considered a consequential damage, and is not allowed.
A consequential damage, is a damage to, or destruction' of, property not
actually taken,' but which results indirectly from a lawful act of taking.8 In
the absence of a statute or constitutional provision' expressly granting com-
pensation, these costs are not allowed,' 0 for the tenant has a duty to move
at the end of his term, 1 and the mere shortening of the term does not give
any right to compensation. Similarly, removal costs are not deemed a taking
of property within the meaning of the Constitution. 12 Allowance of these
costs in computation would be based on conjecture, because removal dis-
tances would vary and no established rule would be applicable.1 3 As an
exception, a few decisions allow the cost of removing personal property, not
as a separate element of damage, but as part of the market value of the
3. United States v. 26,699 Acres of Land, 174 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1949); In re
Cross-Bronx Expresswj't, 195 Misc.. 842, 82 N.Y.S.2d 55 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Riebs v.
Milwaukee County Park Comm'n, 252 Wis. 144, 31 N.W.2d 190 (1948).
4. United States v. Petty Motors Co., suora note 2.
5. United States v. General Motors Corp., supra note 2.
6. Ibid.; of. Gershon Bros. Co. v. United States, 284 Fed. 849 (5th Cir. 1922).
7. Sanguinetti y; United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R.
v. Rockwall County Levee Improvement Dist., 117 Tec 39, 297 S.W. 206 (1927);
so John Horstmann Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 138, 146 (1921).
B. Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923): see In re
Soldiers & Sailors Memorial Bridge, 308 Pa. 487, 490, 162 Ati. 309, 310 (1932).
9. Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 699 (1923); Richmond v. Williams,
114 Va. 698, 77 S.E. 492 (1913).
10. United States v. General Motors Corp., supra note 2; see Stephenson Brick Co.
v. United States, 110 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1940) (loss of future profits); Mitchell v.
United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925) (loss of a business); Omnia Commercial Co. v.
United States, supra note 8 (losses from breach of a contract). But of. Kimball Laundry
Co. v. United'States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
11. United States v. Petty Motors Co., supra note 2; Springfield Southwestern Ry.
v. Schweitzer, 173 Mo. App. 650, 158 S.W. 1058 (1913).
12. United States v. General Motors Corp., supra note 2; Springfield Southwestern
Ry. v. Schweitzer, supra note 11.
13. Springfield Southwestern Ry. v. Schweitzer, supra note 11.
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leasehold. 14 These cases do not overrule the established doctrine, but side-
step it to allow the condemnee the amount he would receive in a voluntary
sale. 5
In the instant case the expropriation for a term originally less than the
entire leasehold period, with an 0option to renew, which was exercised
exhausting the lessee's interest, is considered as if it were a taking of the
entire leasehold interest rather than an expropriation for a shorter period.
This case extends the definition of a "taking of an entire leasehold" to in-
clude one which does not entirely exhaust the lessee's interest originally,
but which does so by the exercise of an option to renew, thus disallowing
the cost of removal under both sets of facts.
EMINENT DOMAIN'W-JUST COMPENSATION-WARTIME
IMPOSED CEILING PRICES
The United States expropriated a commodity from a long term specu-
lator whose purpose was to hold and sell at future high prices. At the time
of the taking, the maximum market price, specified by regulation under
the Emergency Price Control Act,' was lower than the purchase price and
storage costs of the commodity to the owner. The Court of Claims took
cognizance of these facts and allowed compensation greater than this ceiling
price.2 Held, that just compensation as measured by fair market value was
correctly determined by the ceiling price established by the OPA, because
this was the only legal maximum selling price. United States v. Commodi-
ties Trading Corp., 70 Sup. Ct. 547 (1950).
The exercise of the power3 of eminent domain for necessary public
use is subject to the constitutional requirement that just compensation be
made for the property taken. 4 The amount of remuneration paid as com-
pensation follows no strict formula,8 but is normally determined as a judicial
function,0 by the fair market price at the time of the taking.7 In a free
14. James McMillan Printing Co. v. Pittsburgh, C. & W. R.R., 216 Pa. 504, 65
At. 1091 (1902); Metropolitan West Side El. R.R. v. Siegel, 161 11. 638, 44 N.E.. 276
(1896).
15. Metropolitan West Side El. R.R. v. Siegel, srura note 12.
1. 56 STAT. 23 (1942), 50 U.S.C. Ap. § 901 (1946).
2. United States v. Commodities Trading.Corp., 83 F. Supp. 356 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
3. See United States v. Gettysburg Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 681 (1896) (implied power);
TIHOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 2575 (Penn. ed. 1939) (inherent power).
4. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; cf. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 149
U.S. 312, 341 (1892).
5. United States v. Cors. 337 U.S. 325 (1949); United States v. Petty Motor Co.,
327 U.S. 372, 377 (1946); Wilson Mfg. Co. v. United States, 161 F.2d 915, 918 (7th
Cit. 1947).
6. See National City Bank of N.Y. v. United States, 275 Fed. 855, 859 (S.D. N.Y.
1921).
7. Louisville Flying Service. Inc. v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 938 (W. D. Ky.
1945); C. C. Blacke Co. v. United States, 275 Fed. 861 (S.D. Ohio 1921).
